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79-448 Reid v. Georgia
MR. JUSTICE POWEll, concurrinq.*

This case is similar in many respects to United
States v. Mendenhall,

U.S. ____ (May 27, 19RO).

The

defendant in that case also was stopped by DEA aqents at an
airport for identification, she thereafter accompanied the
agents to their office for auestioninq, and was searched
there.

The case presented a number of auestions, and

Justices here expressed divergent views on some of them.
The threshold question in Mendenhall, as in this
case, was whether there was a "seizure" within the meaninq of
* I aqree, on the basis of the fraqmentary facts apparently
relied upon by the DEA aqents in this case, there was no
justification for a "seizure".

2.

the Fourth Amendment when the aqents initially stopped the
defendant only for the purpose of asking identification
auestions.

Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice

Rehnauist, concluded that the mere stopping of a person for
identification purposes was not a seizure so lonq as the
individual could walk away:

"We conclude that a person who has been 'seized'
within the meanina of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a rea.sonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave." Slip op. at 9.*
*r.otr. Justice Stewart also noted that "[t~ nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets." I~., at 7, auotinq
Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s., at 34 (~Jhite,J., concurrina).

3.

On the basis of facts that were remarkably similar to those
in the present case, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist concluded that there was no seizure.
Three other Justices, in a concurrinq opinion in
Mendenhall, did not consider it necessary to decide whether
there had been a seizure.

It was their view that even

assuming that the stop

constitute a seizure, the DEA

~id

}.

•'

agents had articulable and reasonable grounds for suspicion
that t.he individual who had deplaned from an airplane was
engaging in criminal activity.

They therefore did not

violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping such person for
routine questioning.
These Justices expressly stated that they did not necessarily

,.

..

,

- "

4.

disaqree with the views of Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr.
Justice Pehnouist.

SliP. op., at

, n. 1.*

As the Supreme Court of Georqia

dP.ci~P-d

this

caseprior to this Court's decision in Mendenhall, it did not
consjder whether in fact there had been any seizure of the
petitioner.

Rather, it assumed that the stop for routine

identification

questioni~

constitueo a sPizure, and

addressed its opinion to the question whether this
nevertheless was iustified by arituculable and rPasonable
arounds of suspicion.
*Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice BrPnnan, Mr.
Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting
opinion in Mendenhall in which they concluded that there had
been a seizure, and that there were not insufficient qrounds
to justify it.

s.

As the initial seizure issue was not considered by
the courts below, it is open for them on remand to address it
in liqht of the issues expressed in Mendenhall.

I

~

I.••

lr(): The Chief Just1os

Mr.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurrinq.

1

This case is similar in many respects to United
States v.

~endenhall,

~u.s.

____

(May 27, 1980), in which

a defendant observed walkin9 through an airport was stopped
by DEA aaents and asked for identification.

The threshold

auestion in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the aaent's
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the
meaninq of the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. Justice Stewart, joined

by Mr. Justice Rehnouist, was of the opinion that the mere
stoppin9 of a person for identification purposes is not a
seizure:
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within
the meaninq of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
iew of all of the circumstances _ surroundina the
incident, a reasonable person would have belie~ed
that he was not free to leave." Slip op. at 9.
(/Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in
the present case, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice

2.

Rehnquist decided that no seizure had occurred.
My concurrina opinion in

~P.ndenhall,

joined by the
-::::

Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun, did not consider the
seizure issue because it had not been raised in the courts
below.

Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was my

view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable
grounds for believinq that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity.

Therefore, they did not violate the

Fourth Amendment by stoppinq that person for routine
auestioninq without regard to resolution of the seizure
auestion. I expressly stated, however, that my decision not
to reach the seizure issue did not necessarily indicate
disagreement with the views of Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr.
Just ice Rehnqu ist.

Slip ~

op •1 ,

at

The state courts, which

, n. 1. 3
decided this case before

our decision in Mendenhall, djd not consider whether the
petitioner had been sejzed c Rather, those courts apparently
assumed that the stop for routine identification questioning
constit f a a seizure, and addressed only the · question whether
the aaent's actions were justified by arefjculable and
reasonable arounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not
consider the initial seizure question in our decision today,
that issue remains open for consideration by the state courts
in liaht of the opinions in

~endenhall.

3

FOOTNOTES
1. I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts
apparently relied upon by the DEA agents in this case, there
was no justification for a
2.

"seizur~'

/

Mr. Justice Stewart also noted that "' [t]here

is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman
from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.'"
at 7, auotinq Terry v. Ohio, 392

u.s.,

.!_£.,

at 34 (White, J.,

-

concurring). See also ante, at n.2.
3.

Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice

Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshal) and Mr. Justice Stevens, filed
a dissentina opinion in MendenDall in which they concluned
that
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MR. JusTICE PoWJo}LL, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN J
joi~

concurring. 1
This case is similar in many respects to United States v~
Mendenhall, U. S. (May 27, 1980) , in which a defendant observed walking through an airport was stopped
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART,
joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is
not a seizure:
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Slip op., at 9. 2
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. J u sTICE
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred.
My concurring opinion in M endenhall, joined by THE
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con1 I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon
by tlw DEA agf'nt:; in thi ~ case, there was no ju~tifi ra tion for a "seizure."
~MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART also noted that "' [t]here is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing que:;tions to
anyone on the streets.'" /d ., at 7, quoting T erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at
34 (WHI'l't.:, J., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2.

{JJ,/h

!tEl~

v. OEO!tOtA

sider the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning
without regard to resolution of the seizure question. I expressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with
the views of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. Slip op., at - , n. 1.8
The state courts, which decided this case before our decision in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner
had been seized. Rather. those courts apparently assumed
that the stop for routine identification questioning constituted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of'
the opinions in Mendenhall.

3

joined by MR. Jus'I'ICE BRENNAN, MR . Jus'riCE
and MR. .Jus•ncE STEVENS, filed a dis:;enting opinion in
Mendenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had been de:tained in violation of the Fotlt'th Arm:n<Inreat ..
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF GEORGIA
No. 79-448. Decided

Jm::le_,~I:::9.::80:__ _ _ _ _

1

MR. JusTICE PoWJo}LL, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN }
j ~ concurring.1

Jusna=

1...--~---

This case is similar in many respects to United States v.
U. S. (May 27, 1980), in which a defendant observed walking through an airport was stopped
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART,
joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is
not a seizure:
11
We conclude that a person has been 1seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Slip op., at 9. 2

Mendenhall, -

Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred.
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con1 I agree, on the basis o{ the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon
by the DEA agE-nt:; in this casE>, there was no justification for a "seizure."
2 MR. JUSTICE STEWAR'l' also noted that " '[t]here is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents n policeman from addressing que;tions to
anyone on the streets.'" ld., at 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at
34 (WHITE, J., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2.
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sider the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning
!WttbOllt IE!t§AI El te Feseht6ieft of tfle seiettre qttes6iaR. I expressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with
the views of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. Slip op., at , n. 1.8
The state courts, which decided this case before our decision in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner
had been seized. Rather. those courts apparently assumed
that the stop for routine identification questioning constituted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of
the opinions in Mendenhall.

3

MR. Jus•ncE Wlfl'l'E, joined by MR. Jus1'ICE BRENNAN, MR. JusTICE'
MARSHALL, nnd MR. Jus•ncE STEVENs, filed a dissenting opinion in

Mendenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had be.en de.tained in violatiQn of the Fourth Arr~ub:neut~
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Decided

1

This case is similar in many respects to United States v.
U. S. (May 27, 1980) , in which a defendant observed walking through an airport was stopped
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART,
joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is
not a seizure:

Mendenhall, -

"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Slip op., at 9. 2
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred.
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not conI agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon
by thr DEA ugf-'nt:< in thi,: r·asr, tlwrP was uo ju:;tifi<·atiou for a ""Pizure."
~ Mu. JusTICE S•rEWAn'l' also noted that "'[t]hcre is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents :L policeman from uddrel>~ing questions to
anyone on the strPets.'" /d ., at 7, quoting 'I'erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at
34 (WHI'l't.:, J., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2.
1

JtAJd

ltEUJ v.

(j EOltG!A

sidm· the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizur·e, it was
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning
urjthou* regard ts rsse'ro·
sjzpse qnszo;cn. I expressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with
the views of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. Slip op., a.t - , n. 1.~
The state courts, which decided this case before our decision in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner
ha(I been sei11f'd. Rather. those courts apparent]y assumed
that the stop for routine identification questioning constituted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of
the opinions in Mendenhall.
p
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joined by MH . Jus•rrc~:: BRJ::NNAN , MH . Jus•rrc~
and MR. .Jus·ncJ:: STEVENS, filed a di:;:;enting opinion in
Mnulenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had ~n de_tuincd in violation of the Fourth Armmdmem ..
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MH. JusTic•~ Pow~-:LL, with whom
joii , concurring. 1

iR. JusTIC~ BLACKMUN

This case is similar in many respects to Un:ited States v.
Mendenhall, (May 27, 1980) , in which a defendant observed walking through an airport was stopped
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART,
joined by MH. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is
not a seizure:

u. s. -

"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Slip op., at 9. 2
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in
the present case, MR. J u sTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred.
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall , joined by THE
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not conI agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon
by til(' DEA ugent:-: in thi~ ra:sf•, tlwrP wus no ju:::tifi('atiou for a " ~Pizure . "
~ Mn. JusTin; Sn~WAH'r also noted that "' [t]here is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addre:;:;ing questions to
anyone on the streets.'" ld ., at 7, quoting T erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at
34 (WHI'l'B , J ., concuning). See also ante, at n. 2.
1
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sicler the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning
woltbont l'll~611rii h IPIIIJOJ,tion gf the §eizms 'if!IBIJtiWt. I expressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with
the views of MR. JusTICJo} STEWART and Ma. JusTICE REHNQUIST. Slip op., a.t - , n. 1.~
The state courts, which decided this case before our decision in Mendenhall, diu not consider whether the petitioner
had been seil'-ed. Rather. those courts apparently assumed
that the stop for routine identification questioning constituted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of
the opinions in Mendenhall.

a MH. JuS'rrcr; WHI'i'E, joined by MH. Jus•ncE BHENNAN , MH. Jus•ncE
MAHSHALL, and MH. .JusncF; STEV!!:NS, filed a di::;senting opinion in

Me1ulenhall in which they concluded tha.t the respondent had be.en de.tuined in violatiqn of the Follfth Al'll(ludmelft ..
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TOMMY REID, JR. v. STATE OF GEORGIA
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MH. JusTICE PowELL;, with whom THE CHIEF JuBTICE and
Mu. JuBTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring. 1
This case is similar in many respects to United States v.
Mendenhall, - - U. S. (May '27, 1980), in which a de~
fendant observed walking through an airport was stopped
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JuS'l'ICE STEWART,
joined by Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is
not a seizure:
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason~
able person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Slip op. , at 9.2
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE
REHNQUIS'l' decided that no seizure had occurred.
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con~
I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon
by the DEA agent;; in this ca~e, that there was uo ju~:;tifica.tion for a
"seizure."
2 MH. JusTICE S·rEWAH'r also noted tha.t "'[t]here is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addres::;ing questions to
anyone on the streets.'" Jd., a.t 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at
34 (WHITE, J., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2.
1

26
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sider the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was
my view that the DEA agents had articulable aud reasonable
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violatP the Fourth
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning
I expressly stated, however, that my uecision uot to reach the
seizure issue did not uecessarily indicate disagreement with
the views of Mn. Jus·rrcE 8'l'hlWAHT and MR. Jus·rrcE REHNQUIST. Slip op., at - , n. 1.8
The state courts, which decided this case before our decision in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner
had been seized. Rather, those courts apparently assumed
that the stop for routine identification questioning constituted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of
the opinions in Mendenhall.

8 Mn. JusTICE WHI'l'E,

joined by MR. Jus'J'ICE BHENNAN, MR. JusTICE
and MH. JusTICE STEVENS, filed a dissPnting opinion in
Mendenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had been de·
tained in violation of lhe Fourth Amendment.
MARSHALL,

